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ALBERTA LAW REVIEW
A CHOICE AMONG VALUES:
THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
ON THE DEFENCE OF NECESSITY
BENJAMIN L. BERGER*
The author explores various theoretical approaches
to the defence of necessity, rejecting both excusatory
conceptions of the defence and those based on the
notion of moral involuntariness. Rather, the author
argues that necessity is properly understood as a
justificatory defence based on a lack of moral
blameworthiness. After extensively surveying the
history of the defence in Canadian law, the author
critiques the way in which the Supreme Court of
Canada has restricted the defence. He contrasts the
current Canadian approach with the treatment of the
defence in other jurisdictions and concludes that
Canadian law would be served best by a robust
defence of necessity, which would acknowledge that,
in some circumstances, pursuit of a value of greater
worth than the value of adherence to the law can be
justified.
L 'auteur examine diverses ddmarches thdoriques a
la ddfense de la ndcessit, rejetant les conceptions
d'excuse de la difense et celles qui sontfondies sur
la notion de caractkre involontaire du point de vue
moral. L 'auteur argumente plut6t le fait que la
ndcessiti est bien acceptge dans le cas de difense
justifiable fondie sur un manque de riprihension
morale. Aprks un examen approfondi de l 'histoire de
la difense dans le droit canadien, l'auteur fait la
critique de la manibre dans laquelle la Cour supreme
du Canada a limitd la defense. II compare la
d~marche canadienne actuelle au traitement de la
defense dans d'autresjuridictions, et conclut que la
loi canadienne pourrait profiler d'une solide d~fense
de la nicessit, reconnaissant ainsi que dans certains
cas, on peut lustifier la poursuile de la valeur d'un
plus grand m&ite pluttt que la valeur du respect de
la loi.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The defence of necessity has long been a source of heated debate in Anglo-Canadian
criminal jurisprudence. Theorists have spun hypothetical situations that test the limits of
the law of necessity, and philosophers have analyzed the ethical dimension of the
problems posed by the defence. Indeed, the defence of necessity can be viewed as a
conceptual touchstone for broad questions about the purposes of criminal law and the
nature of criminal responsibility. Necessity draws out understandings of blameworthiness
and tests our frameworks of values. Despite this historical attention and theoretical
consequence, necessity does not cut a significant figure in contemporary Canadian
criminal law. It is neither a defence recognized explicitly in the Criminal Code nor is it
one that frequently finds its way before our courts. When it has come under judicial
scrutiny, our courts have closely circumscribed and even constricted the defence.
Student, Faculty of Law, University of Victoria, British Columbia; Law Clerk to McLachlin C.J.C.
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Canada's nearly moribund defence of necessity leaves a gap in our criminal
jurisprudence. It creates an aspect of the criminal law that is neither logically consistent
nor morally sufficient. By first locating the defence in a philosophical landscape, one can
appreciate the role that a vital defence of necessity ought to assume. From this point it is
instructive to trace the history of our inheritance of the law from its English sources with
a view to understanding the defence in its modern context. Finally, drawing from the
wisdom of this history and the legal frameworks found in other jurisdictions, one can
construct a robust and morally adequate defence of necessity that could serve an
increasingly germane role in our criminal law.
11. FRAMING THE PROBLEM
Two of the core tenets of Canadian criminal law are that only the morally blameworthy
ought to be punished and only punished in accordance with the degree of their
blameworthiness. The entire criminal justice process is fundamentally focused upon
discerning who ought to be punished and to what degree. The procedural guarantees and
substantive fairness requirements provided at common law, and now assured by the
Charter, seek to ensure that only those "deserving" of punishment receive criminal
sanction. One jurisprudential tool consummately concerned with the attribution and
avoidance of blame is the law of defences.
Simply, defences provide means by which an accused individual can assert that he or
she is not blameworthy. Of course, this assertion can be made in many ways. Under the
defence of intoxication the accused claims that he did not possess the requisite mens rea
to be convicted of the specific offence charged. An accused who argues self-defence
concedes that he acted intentionally, but asserts that he had every right to take the actions
that he did. The defence of provocation functions as a concession to human frailty in that,
based on the emotional state of the accused, it reduces murder to manslaughter and
thereby mitigates the punishment for an unlawful act for which the requisite mens rea and
actus reus exist. In each of these examples, the defence is making a somewhat different
claim about the lack diminished nature of the accused's blameworthiness.
So upon what claim does the defence of necessity rest? In his Commentaries, William
Blackstone suggested one possible understanding of claims of necessity:
These are a constraint upon the will, whereby a man is urged to do that which his judgment disapproves,
and which, it is to be presumed, his will (if left to itself) would reject. As punishments are, therefore,
only inflicted for abuse of that free-will which God has given to man, it is highly just and equitable that
a man should be excused for those acts which are done through unavoidable force and compulsion.'
Blackstone contends that necessity amounts to a claim that the accused was acting in a
state of moral involuntariness. Factors outside of the accused's control leave him little
practical choice but to act in a particular way, perhaps a way in which he would not
normally have chosen to act if these factors were not present. Such a defect in the will
W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England: Book the Fourth, vol. 4 (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1765) at 27.
would render punishment for the act unjust. A similar explanation is provided by David
Jones, who argues that "[o]ne who acts or fails to act out of necessity does not do so
through his own free choice even though he may consciously decide to do what he
does."2
The problem with this contention is that, short of utter involuntariness akin to
automatism, the will is always operating. Can it properly be said that the person who
steals, motivated by the extreme hunger of her family, is operating without will? Even
more so, if this "thief' pauses to recognize that a law exists that prohibits her from
stealing but, on balance, decides that it is more important to take the food, is it accurate
to say that she is in a state of moral involuntariness? Clearly, circumstance suggests a
particular course of action, but it is not accurate to adopt the position that this thief had
no choice - that the act was involuntary. A moral choice is still made, and, therefore,
the act cannot be said to be "unavoidable." But what Blackstone does demonstrate is that,
for various reasons, it would be wrong to punish a person whose will was so strongly
influenced by hardship or emergency. The principle that seems to present is that the
defence of necessity embraces those situations where, by the operation of circumstance,
the accused cannot be said to be morally blameworthy for his actions.
This proposition is consistent with other areas of the criminal law. Indeed, the concept
of mens rea operates to ensure that only the morally blameworthy are punished. To the
degree that the content of mens rea varies from crime to crime, this variance reflects our
assessment of the level of blameworthiness required in order to punish an individual for
commission of the offence. As such, where a great deal of stigma and a severe
punishment attendant upon conviction for a given offence exist, our law requires that the
moral blameworthiness be demonstrated through subjective means. At the other end of the
spectrum, absolute liability offences ask only that the act be committed and require no
subjective blameworthiness. Other defences like duress allow those compelled by other
persons' unlawful threats to be excused from punishment for certain offences. Indeed,
some have argued that the very existence of the defence of duress argues for a recognition
of necessity, because there would be an "evident illogicality involved in excusing one who
acts under pressure from wrongful threats of the 'do this or else' ... variety while not
excusing one who acts under equally strong pressure from the circumstances."3
So if one accepts the principle that underlies Blackstone's understanding of necessity
but rejects the proposition that it arises from moral involuntariness, what is an acceptable
understanding of the defence? One approach is to conceive of necessity as a defence that
operates as an excuse only - a defence that concedes the wrongfulness of the act but
argues that no punishment ought to be imposed. This approach is taken by Immanuel Kant
when he considers the case of a drowning man banishing another from a plank of wood
capable of supporting only one: "An act of violent self-preservation, then, ought not to
be considered as altogether beyond condemnation (inculpabile); it is only to be adjudged
2 D.A. Jones, Crime and Criminal Responsibility (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1978) at 63-64.
1 D.W. Elliott, "Necessity, Duress and Self-Defence" (1989) Crim. L.R. 611 at 613.
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as exempt from punishment (impunibile)."4 George Fletcher understands the great advance
in this reasoning as residing in the recognition that the sole fact that an act is unlawful
is not conclusive of the issue of liability.5 This approach of confining necessity to an
excuse sidesteps the problem of requiring a wholly bound will because even a lesser
"compulsion" can work to mitigate punishment.
However, limiting necessity to an excuse poses troubling illogicalities. What of a
person who, in the woods and near death from starvation, steals a can of food from an
abandoned shack? If one adopts the necessity-only-as-excuse rationale, then the only
possible conclusion is that this act was unlawful. In effect, the person acted wrongfully
by taking the food. The fact that no punishment will be imposed does not detract from
the nominal condemnation of an act that does not seem morally condemnable. This
conceptual difficulty illustrates the proposition that "[q]uestions of justification are part
of the theory of crime; excuses are part of the theory of punishment."6 To the extent that
moral blameworthiness is a sine qua non of criminal responsibility, a proper theory of
crime should not allow this problematic outcome. The morally consistent result would be
to indicate that the accused had made the correct choice and, therefore, had acted lawfully.
So it is the notion of choice that lies at the heart of the defence of necessity. Glanville
Williams suggested as much with the following declaration:
By necessity is meant the assertion that conduct promotes some value higher than the value of literal
compliance with the law.
7
The defence of necessity arises where a choice is made to pursue a value of greater worth
than the value of adherence to the law. As such, a successful defence of necessity
condones the choice to break the law in the given circumstances. In this understanding,
all claims to necessity can be viewed as instances of a choice between the lesser of two
evils. The individual in onerous circumstances must decide whether, based on the potential
consequences of adhering to the law and the harm averted by following some other value,
the act in question should be undertaken. As Galloway points out, this balancing is not
merely a utilitarian one of costs and benefits.8 Rather, an otherwise unlawful act may be
justifiable "a) where purposes rather than results justify; b) where permissible self interest
justifies, and c) where redistribution of harm justifies... it is important to emphasize a
fourth situation, where one grounds the justification on the premise that the right that is
I. Kant, The Philosophy of Law: An Exposition of the Fundamental Principles of Jurisprudence as
the Science of Right, trans. W. Hastie (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1887) at 53.
G.P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978) at 819. Fletcher
is a strong advocate for the conceptual distinguishing of defences that function as justifications and
those that operate as excuses. A great deal of the literature addressing necessity focuses upon this
division and the problems inherent in patrolling the borders between the two. For the purposes of this
article, justifications will be understood as denials of the unlawful nature of an act, whereas excuses
concede the unlawfulness but argue that punishment should nevertheless be reduced or withheld.
6 A. Ripstein, Equality, Responsibility, and the Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999)
at 163.
7 G.L. Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part (London: Stevens & Sons, 1953) at 567.
8 D. Galloway, "Necessity as a Justification: A Critique of Perka" (1986) 10 Dal. L.J. 158 at 168.
infringed is unimportant in comparison with the end that is achieved." 9 As such, a choice
between killing one for the sake of ten may further the higher ideal of the preservation
of life just as the choice to destroy property to prevent a fire from spreading is justified
on the basis of the harm it seeks to avoid.
This approach is the most conceptually consistent with the requirement for moral
blameworthiness in the criminal law. No resort is made to notions of moral
involuntariness, and the illogicalities produced by the excuse conception are avoided. For
these reasons, I will argue that this approach is the most appropriate construction of the
defence of necessity for Canadian criminal law. Yet before considering the defence in its
modern legal context, it is instructive to understand the means by which it entered our
criminal law, as well as the attending debates.
!11. THE HISTORY OF NECESSITY
In his 1765 Commentaries, Blackstone wrote that he would recognize four kinds of
necessity in the criminal law: (I) constraint of a superior, (2) "threats and menaces, which
induce a fear of death or other bodily harm,"'" (3) choices for the lesser of two evils,
and (4) want of food or clothing.'' Blackstone's principled and broad doctrine of
necessity would not, however, find universal favour in the English drive for codification
in the late nineteenth century.
Edward Livingston sought to abolish all common law crimes and terms not defined in
his draft code for Louisiana. He also sought to curtail judicial discretion by forcing
application of the letter of the law and constraining flexibility in sentencing. He did not,
however, include a necessity provision in his code. The duress provision 2 contemplates
only coercion by persons, and, therefore, his code lacked a means of either justifying or
excusing conduct motivated by other types of necessity. This gap goes unmentioned and
we do not know what motivated this departure from the principle of criminal liability
recognized by Blackstone.
Lord Macauley also failed to provide for a necessity defence in his Draft Indian Penal
Code, but his notes on the code explained at length why he had chosen this course. Fie
began by recognizing the redeeming features of such a provision:
[A]s the penal code itself appeals solely to the fears of men, it never can furnish them with motives for
braving dangers greater than the dangers with which it threatens them. Its utmost severity will be
inefficacious for the purpose of preventing the mass of mankind from yielding to a certain amount of
Ibid.
I0 Blackstone, supra note I at 28-30.
Ibid. at 30-31.
2 E. Livingston, The Complete Works of Edward Livingston on Criminal Jurisprudence; Consisting of
Systems of Penal Law for the State of Lousiana and for the United States of America, vol. 2
(Monclair, New Jersey: Patterson Smith, 1968) at 22.
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temptation. It can, indeed, make those who have yielded to the temptation miserable afterwards. But
misery which has no tendency to prevent crime is so much clear evil.
13
This compelling argument would allow for some latitude in situations where an accused
faces "great danger." But Macaulay continued by suggesting that
punishment which is inefficacious to prevent a man from yielding to a certain temptation may often be
efficacious to prevent him from exposing himself to that temptation.... We should therefore think it in
the highest degree pernicious to enact that no act done under the fear even of instant death should be an
offence. It would ?ifortiori be absurd to enact that no act under the fear of any other evil should be an
offence. There are, as we have said, cases in which it would be useless cruelty to punish acts done under
the fear of death, or even of evils less than death. But it appears to us impossible precisely to define these
cases. We have. therefore, left them to the Government, which, in the exercise of its clemency, will
doubtless be guided in a great measure by the advice of the Courts.'
4
Thus Macaulay left the matter of necessity to the discretion of executive clemency. Two
concerns that would later influence the development of a Canadian criminal code appear
in this statement. First is Macaulay's stated anxiety over the ability to contemplate, with
sufficient precision, the cases in which necessity may be a desirable defence. Second,
Macaulay was concerned about the effect that a legislated provision allowing for a defence
of necessity would have on the deterrence of crime.
Also absent from Wright's draft code prepared for Jamaica, 5 it was not until 1878
that the defence of necessity would find its way into a proposed code. In 1877 James
Fitzjames Stephen's Digest of the Criminal Law indicated that the English common law
might excuse a person from criminal liability for an act "done only in order to avoid
consequences which could not otherwise be avoided," and for which there was a
proportionality between the measures taken and the "evil avoided."'16 In 1878 Stephen
considered this understanding of the defence of necessity by including the following
provision in his draft criminal code:
No act is an offence which is done only in order to avoid consequences which could not otherwise be
avoided, and which if they had followed would have inflicted upon the person doing the act, or upon
others whom he was bound to protect, inevitable and irreparable evil, and if no more is done than is
reasonably necessary for that purpose, and if the evil intended to be inflicted by such act is neither
intended nor likely to be disproportionate to the evil intended to be avoided.
No act which causes harm to the person of another is an offence if the person doing it was, without any
fault on his part, so situated at the time that he could not avoid doing the act which caused such harm,
13 Lady Trevelyan, ed., The Works of Lord Macaulay: Complete, vol. 7 (London: Longmans, Green,
and Co., 1866) at 454.
14 Ibid. at 457-58.
15 U.K., H.L. and H.C., "Drafts of Criminal Code and a Code of Criminal Procedure for the Island of
Jamaica, with an Explanatory Memorandum" by R.S. Wright in British Sessional Papers, v. 61
(1877).
16 J.F. Stephen, A Digest of the Criminal Laiv (Crimes and Punishments), 5th ed. (London: Macmillan
and Co., 1894) at 24-25 [hereinafter Digest].
without doing some other act which was equally likely to cause harm to some other person (not being
himself), and if he did the one act only in order to avoid doing the other.
17
Despite the restrictions imposed on invoking the defence (e.g., proportionality, least
harmful means, no assumption of risk) Stephen's construction of the defence constituted
a hard break with the penal reformers that preceded him.
Yet this innovation, a truer reflection of the English law according to Blackstone, was
left on the English Commissioners' cutting-room floor. The Royal Commission on
Indictable Offences Report, the single most influential document in the development of
the 1892 Canadian Criminal Code, included no defence of necessity. Reminiscent of
Macaulay's rationale for not including the defence in his code, the Commissioners
reasoned that it was
if not absolutely impossible, at least not practicable, to foresee all the various combinations of
circtimstances which may happen, but which are of so unfrequent occurrence that they have not hitherto
been the subject of judicial consideration, although they might constitute a justification or excuse, and
to use language at once so precise and clear and comprehensive as to include all cases that ought to be
included, and not to include any case that ought to be excluded.'8
Apparent from this statement is the recognition that necessity may constitute a
justification, or at least an excuse. However, also like Macaulay, the Commissioners
declared that it would be "better to leave such questions to be dealt with when, if ever,
they arise in practice by applying the principles of law to the circumstances of the
particular case.""
By 1883 Stephen seems to have changed his mind as to the appropriateness of
legislating a defence of necessity. In his History of the Criminal Law of England, he
echoes the sentiments of the Commissioners and later states that "[tlhere is not, and I
think there cannot be, any principle involved in cases of [necessity]." 2 Stephen went
even further by asserting that "[tihere is no fear that people will be too ready to obey the
ordinary law. There is great fear that they would be too ready to avail themselves of
exceptions which they might suppose to apply to their circumstances."'" Once again, a
'7 U.K., H.C., "Criminal Code (Indictable Offences), 1878" in British Sessional Papers, vol. 2 (1878),
s. 23. Stephen goes on to refine his necessity provision to include omissions and to exclude acts done
to save a life of an unborn child in favour of the mother. For a discussion regarding Stephen's
contribution in preparing the Act, see L. Radzinowicz & R. Hood, A History of English Criminal Law
and its Administration from 1750, vol. 5 (London: Stevens & Sons, 1986).
'g U.K., Royal Commission on Indictable Offences, Report of the Royal Commission Appointed to
Consider the Law Relating to Indictable Offences: With an Appendix Containing a Draft Code
Embodying the Suggestions of the Commissioners (London: G.E. Eyre & W. Spottiswoode, Her
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1879) at 10.
'9 Ibid. at 44.
20 J.F. Stephen, A General View of the Criminal Law of England, 2d ed. (London: Macmillan and Co.,
1890) at 76-77.
21 J.F. Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England, vol. 2 (London: Macmillan and Co., 1883)
at 110.
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concern for the deterrent effect of the law combined with anxiety over statutory precision
barred necessity from the statutory criminal law.
This latter phase in English jurisprudence would prove critical to the development of
Canadian criminal law. Although Burbidge mirrored Stephen's 1877 digest entry,
recognizing the defence of necessity almost verbatim,22 the Canadian codifiers chose to
replicate the Commissioners' approach by not including a necessity provision. This choice
went either unnoticed or unmentioned in the House of Commons.23 There being no such
defence recognized in other Canadian statutes,24 the defence of necessity has thus not
been included in Canadian legislation on the criminal law.25
Most remarkable about this history is that at no point was it suggested that the defence
of necessity ought not to have some continuance, though usually in a form of judicial or
executive discretion. As reflected in Blackstone's writings as well as Stephen and
Burbidge's digests, the defence persisted at common law. The most that some would assert
is that it should not be recognized in statute law owing to concerns about deterrence and
the limits of statutory precision and foresight. Accepted by the Canadian codifiers, these
somewhat specious rationales destined the defence of necessity to a shadowy existence at
common law.
This common law existence had, to this point, proven very limited indeed. In his 1890
digest, which sought to summarize the common law, Burbidge indicated that "[tjhe extent
of this principle is unascertained." 26 The two illustrations that he offers are idiosyncratic
at best. First is an instance in which the Governor of Madras who, after acting in an
arbitrary and illegal manner, was deposed and put under arrest by his council.27 The
judgment of the court indicated that this act was not an offence "if the acts done by the
council were the only means by which irreparable mischief to the establishment at Madras
could be avoided."28 Second, Burbidge provided the example of two sailors in the sea
after a shipwreck. B gets hold of a plank that can only support one man, and A pushes
B off, killing him. Burbidge says that this act also is not a crime.29
22 G.W. Burbidge, Digest of the Criminal Law of Canada: .founded by permission on Sir James
Fitzjames Stephen's Digest of the Criminal Law (Montreal: Carswell & Co., 1890) at 36-38 [emphasis
in original]. To Stephen's provision (Digest, supra note 16) Burbidge added the following reflection:
"The extent of this principle is unascertained. It does not extend to the case of shipwrecked sailors
who kill a boy, one of their number, in order to eat his body" (at 37).
23 See J. Crankshaw, The Criminal Code of Canada and the Canada Evidence Act, 1893 (Montreal:
Whiteford & Theoret, 1894).
24 See H.E. Taschereau, The Criminal Statute Law of the Dominion of Canada, Relating to Indictable
Offences (Toronto: Carswell & Co., 1888).
25 Although the Code did expressly recognize the continued existence of non-codified common law
defences: Criminal Code, 1892, S.C. 55 & 56 Vict., c. 29, ss. 7-8.
2, Burbidge, supra note 22 at 37.
27 R. v. Stratton & Others (1779), 21 St. Tr. 1045.
2H Burbidge, supra note 22 at 38.
29 Ibid.
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Ultimately, the most influential common law decision in the area of necessity was the
famous case of R. v. Dudley & Stephens" in which two sailors survived a shipwreck by
killing and eating the flesh of the cabin boy. The Court of Queen's Bench in Exeter
refused to recognize the necessity of the situation as a justification or an excuse. Rather,
the matter was left to the compassion of the executive branch, compassion that was
exercised. In expressing his misgivings about the defence, Lord Coleridge argued that "the
absolute divorce of law from morality would be of fatal consequence; and such divorce
would follow if the temptation to murder in this case were to be held by law an absolute
defence of it."'" Lord Coleridge put his finger on the key issue with respect to the
defence of necessity - the morality of the law. But this observation begs the question:
does a restricted or a flexible understanding of necessity better serve the morality of the
law? As an answer, English jurisprudence offered only a statutory silence and a highly
restrictive common law.
IV. THE MODERN CONTEXT - CANADA AND THE WORLD
So what has Canadian jurisprudence done in the last century with its inherited law of
necessity? I argue above that, owing to the conceptual illogicalities of both the "moral
involuntariness" and "necessity-only-as-excuse"explanations, the most satisfying vision
of necessity is that, in some circumstances, it is morally correct to pursue a value other
than strict adherence to the law. By this view, a necessary act is justifiable. This approach
does not preclude necessity from ever amounting to an excuse. Where the balance is
unclear or wrongly made, that law may choose to reduce punishment in recognition of the
onerous nature of the circumstances. But if an act is truly necessary - where the
balancing of values substantially or clearly favours breaking the law - it is most
appropriate to justify the accused's conduct.
Canadian criminal jurisprudence has not followed this trajectory. In R. v. Perka" the
Supreme Court of Canada provided its most thorough articulation of the common law
defence of necessity.33 Dickson J. (as he was then), speaking for the majority, declares
that necessity is an excuse. His concerns with recognizing necessity as a justification
hearken back to the concerns of the English codifiers. He argues that a justification
through necessity "could well become the last resort of scoundrels."34 Why the same
could not be said of necessity as an excuse is not clear. What is more, Dickson J. states
that to hold that "ostensibly illegal acts can be validated on the basis of their
expediency"35 would require courts to "assess the relative merits of social policies
' (1884), L.R. 14 Q.B.D. 273 [hereinafter Dudley & Stephens].
" Ibid. at 287.
32 [1984] 2 S.C.R. 232 [hereinafter Perka]. See also R. v. Hibbert, [19951 2 S.C.R. 973 where the
Supreme Court affirmed its reasoning in Perka.
" The common law defence of necessity is preserved in the current Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-
46, s. 8(3). Section 17, entitled "Compulsion by threats" is the statutory instantiation of the defence
of duress.
14 Perka, supra note 32 at 248.
5 Ibid.
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underlying criminal prohibitions,"36 a task that he understands as outside the realm of
appropriate judicial functions.
When he turns his mind to necessity as an excuse, Dickson J. relies upon two notions
criticized above. First, he founds his theory of necessity on the notion of "moral
involuntariness." This theory, proposed by Blackstone in 1850, fails to adequately deal
with situations in which the accused makes a choice out of necessity that involves engaged
moral evaluation. It is not convincing to assert that this accused is acting in any
involuntary manner. Secondly, by limiting the defence of necessity to an excuse, Dickson
J. requires that the court first condemn any necessary action as unlawful before conceding
that blame is not properly assigned. Seemingly, Dickson J. would judge the person who
commits a minor property crime to save many lives to have acted wrongly.
In her minority opinion, Wilson J. recognizes these defects and sees that necessity-as-
justification "is a door which should be left open by the Court."37 Wilson wants the court
to ask "whether or not the accused acted so as to attract society's moral outrage."3 In
the absence of moral condemnation, acts may be said to be rightful rather than wrongful
and, therefore, justifiable. Thus Wilson J. rejects the "moral involuntariness" thesis as the
central issue in necessity:
Where the defence of necessity is invoked as a justification the issue is simply whether the accused was
right in pursuing the course of behaviour giving rise to the charge. 39
Wilson J., however, unduly limits the kind of duties that can be relied upon to establish
that the accused "was right" to exclusively legal duties. This limitation produces the
anomalous result, recognized by but apparently not troubling to her, that a person who
attempts to rescue a stranger would be "deserving of praise,' 40 but that the act would not
be justifiable. Apart from this flaw, Wilson J. captures the requirements for a
philosophically and morally consistent criminal law. Wilson J.'s minority reasons are
conceptually superior to Dickson J.'s.
Fulfilling the fears of Wilson J., the majority judgment has shut the door on necessity
as a justification in Canadian criminal law. Additionally, the restrictions that Dickson J.
imposed on the defence as an excuse create a situation where an advocate arguing
necessity
will be constrained to characterize the accused's conduct as instinctive, to characterize the instinct as
normal, to characterize alternative action as demonstrably impossible, and finally to characterize the
conduct as a lesser evil than that averted. 41
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid. at 268.
39 Ibid. at 270.
3,) Ibid. at 279.
40 Ibid. at 276.
41 Galloway, supra note 8 at 160.
It is for this reason that the defence of necessity is substantially moribund in Canada.
But the above does not reflect the whole of Canadian thought about the defence of
necessity. In 1982 the Law Reform commission succinctly described its view of the
defence:
The rationale of necessity, however, is clear. Essentially it involves two factors. One is the avoidance of
greater harm or the pursuit of some greater good, the other is the difficulty of compliance with law in
emergencies. From these two factors emerge two different but related principles. The first is a utilitarian
principle to the effect that, within certain limits, it is justifiable in an emergency to break the letter of the
law if breaking the letter of the law will avoid a greater harm than obeying it. The second is a
humanitarian principle to the effect that, again within limits, it is excusable in an emergency to break the
law if compliance would impose an intolerable burden on the accused.4"
The virtue of this description is that it recognizes that, when an act is truly necessary
based on a balancing of interests, the defence should function as a justification. When the
balance is not so clear, but an "intolerable burden" imposed by circumstances existing, the
defence may be more legitimately used as an excuse. This second functioning is very
similar to the "concession to human frailty" model reflected in the defence of provocation.
In effect, the Law Reform Commission recognizes that a morally justified act (based on
a utilitarian balancing in this formulation) is lawful, while a morally unjustifiable act may,
nevertheless, be understandable and, therefore, at least partially excusable.
Necessity is recognized as a justification in a number of foreign jurisdictions. The
French Penal Code provides the following:
Article 122-7
A person is not criminally responsible if that person, facing an actual or imminent danger threatening
himselt, herself, or another, or property, performs an act necessary for the preservation of person or
property, unless there is a disproportion between the means employed and the seriousness of the
threat.
43
This elegant provision sets out a broad and simple defence of necessity. Where an act can
be said to be necessary to preserve the integrity of a person or of property and is not
disproportionate as between the means and the seriousness of the threat, the accused can
take advantage of the defence. The difficulty in this provision resides in its failure to
define the term "necessary." Under what circumstances can an act be said to be necessary?
As well, no provision for excusing an act that falls short of actual necessity exists.
The American Law Institute's Model Penal Code resolves the first defect in the French
system:
42 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Working Paper 29: Criminal Law: The General Part
Liability and Defences (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1982) at 93.
43 France, The French Penal Code of 1994 (as amended as of January 1, 1999), trans. E.A. Tomlinson
(Littleton, Colorado: Fred B. Rothman & Co., 1999) at 39.
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Section 3.02. Justification Generally: Choice of Evils
(1) Conduct that the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another is
justifiable, provided that:
(a) the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be
prevented by the law defining the offense charged; and
(b) neither the Code nor other law defining the offense provides exceptions or defences dealing
with the specific situation involved; and
(c) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise plainly appear.
(2) When the actor was reckless or negligent in bringing about the situation requiring a choice of harms
or evils or in appraising the necessity for his conduct, the justification afforded by this Section is
unavailable in a prosecution for any offense for which recklessness or negligence, as the case may be,
suffices to establish culpability.
44
This section explicitly recognizes that a choice of evils lies at the core of necessity. The
Model Penal Code defines necessity as a situation in which the evil sought to be avoided
is greater than the evil that the law proscribes. This Code does not require that the evil
avoided be clearly, manifestly, or vastly greater. So long as the preponderance of evil
favours committing the act (i.e., greater than 50 percent), the act can be justified as
necessary. The American model adds a provision removing the defence from individuals
who, charged with crimes for which recklessness or negligence suffices to establish
culpability, create the situation that requires the choice of harms. Nevertheless, while
justifying truly necessitous acts, this Code does not include a provision that affords an
excuse in less clear situations.
The Penal Code of the Federal Republic of Germany seems to offer the best articulation
of the defence of necessity:
§ 34. Necessity as justification
Whoever commits an act in order to avert an imminent and otherwise unavoidable danger to the life,
limb, liberty, honor, property or other legal interest of himself or of another does not act unlawfully if,
taking into consideration all the conflicting interests, in particular the legal ones, and the degree of danger
involved, the interest protected by him significantly outweighs the interest which he harms. This rule
applies only if the act is an appropriate means to avert the danger.
§ 35. Necessity as excuse
(1) Whoever commits an unlawful act in order to avert an imminent and otherwise unavoidable danger
to his own life, limb, or liberty, or to that of a relative or person close to him, acts without guilt. This
rule does not apply if under the prevailing circumstances the perpetrator could be expected to have
assumed the risk, especially because he was himself the cause of the danger or because he found himself
in a special legal relationship. If however, the perpetrator did not have to assume the risk with regard to
a special legal relationship, the punishment may be reduced in accordance with the provisions of§ 49(1).
4 American Law Institute, Model Penal Code: Official Draft and Explanatory Notes (Philadelphia: The
American Law Institute, 1985) at 42-43.
(2) If, in committing the act, the perpetrator assumes the existence of circumstances which under
subparagraph (1) would excuse his conduct, he shall be punished only if he could have avoided the error.
The punishment shall be reduced in accordance with the provisions of § 49(1). 45
The justification provision imposes a requirement that the interest protected "significantly
outweigh" the interest harmed. This balancing must take place in the context of "all the
conflicting interests," and the actions must be appropriate. This provision, though perhaps
overembracing in its inclusion of honour as a protected interest, has the virtue of clearly
reflecting the philosophical issue at the core of the defence. Where there is a balancing
of interests and one significantly outweighs the other, it is lawful to ignore the legal
requirement. This position is consistent with the theory of justification; however, this
scheme has the further attribute of making a concession to human frailty by partially
excusing a person who commits a crime motivated by a desire to protect the life, limb,
or liberty of himself or those close to him though the harm avoided does not "significantly
outweigh" the evil proscribed. The German Code imposes an additional, and reasonable,
limitation that this partial excuse does not apply where the accused causes or could be
expected to assume the risk.
An additional legal problem should be addressed in any codification. What is the
appropriate result if an accused honestly but mistakenly believes that an act is necessary?
The German Code would excuse such an accused unless "he could have avoided the
error." Where the act was motivated by an honest but mistaken belief in its necessity, this
approach that would allow an accused to take advantage of the defence is consonant with
the underlying concern for moral blameworthiness. Indeed, "a person who yields to a
strong but imaginary fear may be stupid in imagining it, but he is no more blameworthy
than one whose fear is based on reasonable grounds."'' 6
All of these codes, and particularly the German provisions, provide more theoretically
consistent and satisfactory means of recognizing a defence of necessity than presently exist
in Canada. They all reflect the requirement of moral blameworthiness without slipping
into the rhetoric of "moral involuntariness." All avoid the illogicalities of restricting
necessity to the realm of excusatory defences. The most appealing aspect, however, of
these codes is the flexibility built into their provisions. Judges are increasingly being asked
to make decisions that involve situations where competing values are colliding. Whether
this trend is appropriate or not is a debate that yields to the exigencies of reality. The
defence of necessity, properly conceived, is a powerful tool in the criminal law for
addressing some cases that pose difficult moral questions. Without this tool and the
flexibility that it provides, the criminal law compels strict adherence to the letter of the
law and, thereby, risks exactly the danger that so concerned Lord Coleridge in Dudley &
Stephens - the severance of law and morality.
43 Germany, The Penal Code of the Federal Republic of Germany, trans. J.J. Darby (Littleton:
Colorado: Fred B. Rothman & Co., 1987) at 59-60.
4' Elliott, supra note 3 at 615.
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Two case studies are illustrative of this point. The first is A (Children),47 a recent and
tragic case in which the English Court of Appeal (Civil Division) was called upon to
decide whether doctors should separate a set of conjoined twins, thereby condemning one
to certain death but likely saving the life of the other. The two children, Jodie and Mary,
shared a common aorta. Jodie's heart and lungs were sustaining the life of her sister Mary,
but the physiological burden of this condition would, if unaltered, cause the death of both
girls. The court had to decide two issues. First, should the operation be performed?
Second, and more illuminating to this discussion, if the operation should be performed,
could it be performed lawfully? Since the doctors performing the operation recognized
that death or serious harm would be virtually certain to occur as a result of the operation,
the mental element of murder would be satisfied.
All three judges agreed that the operation should be performed, but each decided the
question of lawfulness in a different way. Lord Justice Robert Walker reasoned that
"M[ary]'s death would not be the purpose or intention of the surgery,"48 so the operation
could not be said to be unlawful. More interestingly, both Lord Justice Ward and Lord
Justice Brooke decided this issue on the basis of a justificatory defence. Although Ward
L.J. casts his decision in terms of "quasi self-defence,"49 he uses the reasoning of
necessity to reach this conclusion. Ward asserts that
[t]he respect the law must have for the right to life of each must go in the scales and weigh equally but
other factors have to go in the scales as well ... [T]he conclusion has to be that the carrying out of the
operation will be justified as the lesser evil and no unlawful act would be committed.5"
Clearly, Lord Justice Ward is engaging in a balancing of values that leads him to the
conclusion that it would be improper to declare that the doctors, in carrying out this
operation, would be acting unlawfully.
After reviewing the history of the necessity defence and considering various approaches
to the defence, including Canadian jurisprudence, Lord Justice Brooke comes to a similar
conclusion, explicitly applying a justificatory defence of necessity. Brooke L.J. confines
Dudley & Stephens to the particular facts that were before that court and distinguishes it
from the case at bar. He considers the competing judgments in Perka and clearly favours
Wilson J.'s reasons. Ultimately, however, Lord Justice Brooke invokes Stephen's
formulation of the defence from his Digest and states simply that
[aiccording to Sir James Stephen, there are three necessary requirements for the application of the
doctrine of necessity:
(i) the act is needed to avoid inevitable and irreparable evil;
(ii) no more should be done than is reasonably necessary for the purpose to be achieved;
47 [2000] E.W.J. No. 4875 (C.A. (Civ. Div.)), online: QL (EWJ) [hereinafter A (Children)].
48 Ibid. at para. 429.
49 Ibid. at para. 213.
50 Ibid. at para. 212.
(iii) the evil inflicted must not be disproportionate to the evil avoided.
51
Having satisfied himself that these three criteria have been met in this case, Brooke Li.
finds that the act would be justified.
It is clear that a similar result would not be possible in Canada. Not only has the
Supreme Court of Canada closed the door on necessity as a justification, but the
constraints placed upon necessity as an excuse would seem to prohibit Canadian doctors
in similar circumstances from taking advantage of this defence. If by some device a
Canadian court were able to invoke the defence as an excuse, it would engage the
troubling proposition that the doctors were acting unlawfully, though understandably.
The restrictiveness of the Canadian law of necessity is also demonstrated in R. v.
Latimer. In 1994 Robert Latimer was convicted of second degree murder for asphyxiating
his daughter Tracey. 52 A quadriplegic in continual and excruciating pain as a product of
her cerebral palsy, she faced the prospect of further surgeries that would not alleviate and,
indeed, might exacerbate the pain. In 1997, owing to the improper conduct of the
prosecution with respect to the jury, the Supreme Court of Canada ordered a new trial.53
Latimer was again tried and convicted, but the jury recommended that he be eligible for
parole after one year of custody.54 The judge sentenced Latimer to only one year of
imprisonment, followed by one year of probation instead of the statutorily required life
imprisonment with no parole eligibility for ten years. Latimer appealed the guilty verdict
arguing, among other things, that the trial judge had erred in instructing the jury that the
defence of necessity was not available.
The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal rejected this argument by holding that the defence
was not available to Mr. Latimer.55 The Court upheld the trial judge's charge, in which
Justice Noble, applying the reasoning in Perka, instructed the jury, inter alia, that
necessity can only arise where there is imminent risk with no other choice available.
Noble J. commented that "the decision to do it was taken some 12 days in advance of
when he [the accused] actually did it. One must ask, as a result of that, how his situation
could be described as an emergency. ' 56 The Court of Appeal found that "the defence of
necessity was still left without the necessary 'air of reality' in relation to its essential
elements, including the element of proportionality between the harm caused in violating
the law and the harm entailed in abiding it." 57 Furthermore, the Court agreed with the
Attorney General's submission that the sentence was improper and substituted the life
sentence. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, a unanimous Court confirmed the
Court of Appeal's conclusion that there was no air of reality to the defence of
necessity."
51 Ibid. at para. 355.
52 R. v. Latimer, [1994] S.J. No. 480 (Q.B.), online: QL (SJ).
5. R. v. Latimer (1997), 112 C.C.C. (3d) 193.
54 R. v. Latimer (1997), 121 C.C.C. (3d) 326.
55 R. v. Latimer (1998), 131 C.C.C. (3d) 191 [hereinafter Latimer].
36 Ibid at 203-204.
37 Ibid at 210.
3K R. v. Latimer, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 3.
ALBERTA LAW REVIEW VOL. 39(4) 2002
PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEFENCE OF NECESSITY 863
This result is entirely consistent with and reaffirms the jurisprudence laid out in Perka.
This case demonstrates, however, that the Canadian law of necessity has been so
constricted that a jury will not be permitted to entertain a defence of necessity, either by
way of justification or excuse, even in the face of such harrowing circumstances. The fact
that the jury returned with the suggestion of a reduced punishment and that the trial judge
saw fit to make an exception to the normal sentencing minimum shows that both judge
and jury desperately wished to excuse the crime in some fashion. Canadian law, however,
would not permit them to do so. The act was not sufficiently immediate, not sufficiently
instinctual. He had not "acted 'involuntarily' in the sense of Perka."59 Seemingly, Mr.
Latimer's searching moral deliberations functioned in some way to disentitle him to the
defence of necessity.
V. CONCLUSION
Unlike the German, French, and even the English criminal law, Canadian criminal law
offers no means for the justice system to recognize that circumstances may arise in which
breaking the letter of the law is the morally correct and, therefore, ultimately lawful thing
to do. As for necessity-as-excuse, the defence has been so restricted by the Supreme Court
of Canada that only in cases where the accused has responded to immediate emergencies
with morally involuntary responses will the law permit a concession to onerous
circumstance. Though entirely different on the facts, A (Children) and Latimer are similar
in that they involve extraordinarily difficult balances of values. While the former
demonstrates an instance in which the English courts made use of concepts of necessity
in exigent circumstances, the latter shows that Canada has to date effectively closed the
door to these potentialities.
Many factors, not the least of which is technology, will likely contribute to test the
law's ability to arbitrate among and balance between competing moral values. It seems
the height of institutional hubris to claim that under no circumstances can breaking the
law and thereby pursuing a higher value be justified. In order that the fundamental
precepts of criminal liability be guarded, the law of defences must remain vital and
flexible. The judicial and legislative curtailing of common law defences, particularly the
defence of necessity, threatens to render the legal system morally irrelevant. If, like other
jurisdictions, Canada recognized ajustificatory defence based upon necessity,judges and
juries would be able to remain faithful to the principle that only the morally blameworthy
should be condemned. The legal system would be able to recognize those cases in which,
owing to onerous circumstances and a powerful competing moral good, breaking the letter
of the law would not be unlawful. In this area, morality and the law would be
reintegrated.
59 Latimer, supra note 55 at 209.
